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A History of Success? 
Proportionality in International Economic Law 
Valentina Vadi* 
Undoubtedly, philosophers are in the right 
when they tell us that nothing is great or little 
otherwise than by comparison. 
Jonathan Swift, Gulliver’s Travels 
Introduction 
The migration of the proportionality analysis from constitutional law to a number of other areas of law 
is deemed to be a paradigm of successful legal transplant. While some aspects of proportionality 
analysis are deeply ingrained in international trade law and European Union (EU) law, proportionality 
analysis has gradually found its way to international investment law and arbitration. Proportionality is 
often depicted as an ideal mechanism for balancing opposing interests and thus creating equilibrium 
between different public goods – namely economic growth spurred by foreign direct investment and 
trade on the one hand, and other public interests on the other. 
Can proportionality analysis be a useful tool of judicial governance in international economic 
law to promote the perceived legitimacy of the latter? Can it facilitate the consideration of the 
commonweal in investment economic law and/or contribute to the humanization of the same? If so, 
can one size of proportionality analysis fit all needs in international trade, international investment law 
and EU law? Or should a more nuanced and varied understanding of proportionality – as adopted by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – be adopted to cope with different needs in 
various institutional settings? What are, if any, the possible shortcomings of proportionality analysis? 
How can these shortcomings be addressed? 
The chapter shows that while the concept of proportionality has analytical merits, it also 
presents a number of pitfalls when applied to the context of economic disputes. While proportionality 
is a general principle of EU law,1 and is deeply ingrained in international trade law, no consensus 
                                                 




seems to have arisen with regard to its legal status in international law. If proportionality was a general 
principle of law, or was deemed to reflect state practice (and thus constitute an element of customary 
law) it could be eventually used in international investment law and arbitration as part of the 
applicable law or as a matter of treaty interpretation. In the uncertainty as to the legal status of 
proportionality in international law, the legal grounds for considering proportionality in investor-state 
arbitration can be problematic. Certainly, if the applicable law is the law of the host state and this law 
includes the proportionality principle, such principle becomes relevant in the context of investment 
treaty arbitration. This chapter concludes that more comparative and international law studies are 
needed to ascertain the legal status of proportionality in international law. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, after a brief introduction, the study highlights the 
promises and pitfalls of the proportionality analysis. Second, it focuses on the specific migration of the 
notion of proportionality from its constitutional matrix to the regional sphere, focusing on EU law as a 
case study of successful legal migration. Third, it examines the use of the proportionality analysis in 
international investment law and arbitration. Fourth, it examines the use of the proportionality analysis 
in international trade law. Fifth, a critical assessment is provided, focusing on some critical 
methodological questions concerning the migration of constitutional ideas and the identification of 
general principles of law. The conclusions will then sum up the key arguments of the study. 
Proportionality: A Cosmopolitan Destiny? 
Proportionality has moved across a wide range of national, regional and international legal systems.2 
As a legal concept, proportionality expresses the idea that there should be a balance between 
competing objectives or values. In a number of constitutional traditions, the concept of proportionality 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 See generally Evelyn Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe (Hart Publishing 1999). 
2 Moshe Cohen-Elya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (CUP 2012) 2, noting that in the past 
decades proportionality has become ‘one of the most prominent instances of the successful migration of constitutional ideas’. 
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is understood as a methodological framework for balancing conflicting values and aiming at 
delimiting the legitimate exercise of state authority.3 
Conceived as a tool for reviewing state conduct (and thus closely connected with the aim of 
ensuring good governance), the proportionality test is usually articulated in three main phases; 
suitability, necessity and proportionality.4 The suitability test requires that the adopted measure be 
appropriate to achieve the stated aims. There must be a rational, logical and causal relationship 
between the measure and its objectives. The necessity test aims at verifying that the measure was the 
least restrictive available alternative or that no less drastic means were available. The proportionality 
test in the narrow sense requires adjudicators to ascertain that the benefit obtained from realizing the 
objective exceeds the harm caused by the adopted measure. 
The main reason for proportionality’s success in the marketplace of ideas is its ability to: (1) 
restrain the exercise of public authority; (2) shape judicial review; and (3) manage private actors’ 
expectations. This section examines these three functions of the proportionality analysis. 
First, proportionality is based on ‘a culture of justification’ which ‘requires that governments 
should provide substantive justification for all their actions …’.5 In order to be legitimate, a 
governmental action must be ‘justified in terms of its “cogency” and its capacity for “persuasion,” that 
is, in terms of its rationality, reasonableness’,6 and efficiency.7 Proportionality is a ‘deliberative 
methodology’,8 which requires that all of the relevant factors be considered and can insert ‘Socratic 
                                                 
3 Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Balancing, the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing as a Problematic Topic in Comparative 
(Constitutional) Law’ (2008) 31 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 555. 
4 Jan H Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’ (2000) 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 239, 240–41. 
5 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’ (2011) 59 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 463, 467. 
6 ibid 475. 
7 ibid 467. 
8 Iddo Porat, ‘Some Critical Thoughts on Proportionality’ in Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara Valentini 
(eds), Reasonableness and Law (Springer 2009) 243, 244. 
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contestation’ in the deliberative process of governmental action.9 It then requires that a balance be 
struck according to the importance of the relevant interests depending on the contextual circumstances. 
Second, proportionality limits the subjectivity of the adjudicator, empowering courts and 
tribunals to review state conduct in a significant fashion, and providing a structured, formalized and 
seemingly objective test. All awards and decisions must state the reasons on which they are based;10 
failure to state such reasons is a ground for annulment of the award.11 Proportionality also allows 
adjudicators to adopt nuanced decisions rather than ‘all-or-nothing’ approaches12 and to structure their 
analysis in a framework which ‘may produce better and more convincing reasoning, and enable clearer 
assessment … of tribunals’, thus enhancing predictability.13 In addition, proportionality can provide ‘a 
common language that transcends national borders and that allows for dialogue and exchange of 
information’ between courts and tribunals.14 Proportionality analysis can constitute an entry for non-
economic interests as expressed in general principles of law into the argumentative framework of 
adjudication and thereby help to overcome the fragmentation of international law.15 
Finally, proportionality can also delimit – and thus indirectly define – the legitimate 
expectations of private actors vis-à-vis regulatory or other types of governmental interference with 
their vested rights. Proportionality analysis can ‘reduc[e] the sense of defeat for the losing party. As 
                                                 
9 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights Based Proportionality 
Review’ (2010) 4 Law & Ethics Human Rights 141. 
10 See generally Pierre Lalive, ‘On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards’ (2010) 1 Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement 55, 55. 
11 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention or 
Washington Convention), Washington, 18 March 1965, in force 14 October 1966, 575 UNTS 159, art 52(1). 
12 Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, ‘Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State Regulatory Actions 
in the Public Interest – The Concept of Proportionality’ in Stephan Schill (ed), International Investment Law and 
Comparative Public Law (OUP 2010) 75, 79. 
13 ibid 103. 
14 Cohen-Eliya and Porat, ‘Proportionality and the Culture of Justification’ (n 5), 472. 
15 Stephan Schill, ‘Cross-Regime Harmonization through Proportionality Analysis: The Case of International Investment law, 
the Law of State Immunity and Human Rights’ (2012) 27 ICSID Review FILJ 87. 
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such, it is consensus-oriented because it acknowledges explicitly that there are valid constitutional 
arguments on both sides and that the arguments outweighed by the opposing ones do not lose thereby 
their constitutional weight’.16 
Despite the success of proportionality analysis in a number of fields,17 its legal status remain 
unsettled. Some authors contend that proportionality is an emerging general principle of international 
law,18 or even an already established one.19 If one admits that such proposition is true, then such a 
contention would constitute a formidable entry point for proportionality analysis in supranational 
adjudication, as adjudicators could refer to proportionality in their awards as either part of the 
applicable law, under article 42 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention),20 or as a rule of international law applicable 
in the relations between the parties under article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).21 If proportionality is a general principle of law, it can help the interpreter address 
the high level of indeterminacy of treaty provisions. Others contend that also good faith interpretation, 
as restated by article 31(1) of the VCLT may require some balancing between the public and the 
private interest.22 
Proportionality: The Perils of Success 
The migration of the concept of proportionality from constitutional law to the supranational sphere 
poses a range of challenges. In particular, its viability as the main tool for balancing different interests 
                                                 
16 Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics’ in Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor 
and Chiara Valentini (eds), Reasonableness and Law (Springer 2009) 129, 145. 
17 See generally Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (2008) 47 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 73, 98–111. 
18 Andreas Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (CUP 2012), 169. 
19 See generally Enzo Cannizzaro, Il principio della proporzionalitá nell’ordinamento internazionale (Giuffré 2000). 
20 ICSID Convention, art 42. 
21 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980, UN Treaty Series vol 1155, 331. 
22 Benedict Kingsbury and Stephan Schill, ‘Investor–State Arbitration as Governance: Fair and Equitable Treatment, 
Proportionality and the Emerging Global Administrative Law’ (2009) New York University School of Law, Public Law & 
Legal Research Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No 09-46, 23. 
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and values has been challenged on five grounds: (1) institutional competences; (2) scale of values; (3) 
cultural arguments; (4) incommensurability and (5) overprotection of property rights. 
First, proportionality can be perceived as running against the traditional allocation of 
institutional competences among the executive, the judiciary and the administrative organs. 
Democratic arguments run against using balancing to review the host state’s decisions, because 
adjudicators would second-guess the decisions of the host state by repeating the original decision-
making process.23 By considering different alternatives to given measures under the necessity test, and 
by balancing competing interests under the proportionality test the adjudicator interferes with the 
regulatory autonomy of states, supplanting the role of legitimately deputed decision-makers.24 The rise 
of the proportionality analysis ‘as a juristic method, rather than a method restricted to legislation, 
threatens the sharp distinction between legislation and legal interpretation …’.25 As Stone Sweet and 
Mathews put it, ‘balancing can never be dissociated from lawmaking: it requires judges to behave as 
legislators’.26 In particular, the necessity test would – almost without exception – invalidate the given 
measure since the adjudicator can always envisage alternatives ex post with the benefit of hindsight. 
Second, proportionality does not clarify the scale of values to be used in order to evaluate 
competing objectives. Even if the given measure passes the suitability and necessity tests, it may be 
considered to be disproportionate under the third prong of the test, when it is assessed in the light of 
competing norms and objectives. In this context, as Jans put it ‘The central question [i]s what must be 
proportionate to what’.27 Proportionality analysis tells us nothing about the scale of values that will 
determine the final outcome. The fact that proportionality concerns quantity rather than quality leaves 
                                                 
23 Iddo Porat, ‘Why All Attempts to Make Judicial Review Balancing Principled Fail?’ (Paper presented at the VII World 
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law, Athens, 11–15 June 2007) 7. 
24 Kulick, Global Public Interest in International Investment Law (n 18) 172. 
25 David Kennedy, ‘Political Ideology and Comparative Law’ in Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds) The Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Law (CUP 2012) 35, 36. 
26 Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (n 17) 88. 
27 Jans, ‘Proportionality Revisited’ (n 4) 239. 
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the adjudicator free to select his or her own value system, and the relevant criteria to explain why one 
value is considered more important than another.28 
Third, not only can proportionality analysis not take into account the cultural context of a 
given measure but it also risks importing its specific cultural baggage into the adjudicative process. On 
the one hand, supranational adjudicators may not be familiar with the background of a given policy 
measure. As Burke White and von Staden point out, ‘prioritization of the values chosen by the polity 
requires both familiarity with those values and a degree of embeddedness within that polity’.29 
However, supranational adjudicators are far removed from the polities over which they exercise 
control. 
On the other hand, proportionality comes from a certain historical setting,30 reflecting distrust 
towards the public administration in the aftermath of WWII.31 In a number of European countries, 
constitutional law has gained an increasing primacy since the end of the war and the democratic 
transitions that followed.32 Constitutional courts have played a key role in making constitutional law 
effective,33 aiming to be an ‘impenetrable bulwark against any infringement of the rights of the 
people’.34 At the same time, lawyers elaborated the respective constitutions on the basis of ‘their 
understanding of state and society’ with ‘distinct starting points and trajectories’.35 
                                                 
28 Stone Sweet and Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism’ (n 17) 89. 
29 Wiliam W Burke White and Andreas von Staden, ‘Private Litigation in a Public Private Sphere: The Standard of Review in 
Investor–State Arbitrations’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal of International Law 283, 336. 
30 Cohen-Elya and Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (n 2) 8. 
31 Michal Bobek, ‘Reasonableness in Administrative Law: A Comparative Reflection on Functional Equivalence’ in Giorgio 
Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor and Chiara Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and Law (Springer 2009) 311, 323. 
32 Miguel Schor, ‘Mapping Comparative Judicial Review’ (2008) 7 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 257, 
271. 
33 Mauro Cappelletti, ‘Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of “Constitutional Justice”’ (1985) 35 
Catholic University Law Review 191. 
34 ibid 191 (quoting Piero Calamandrei). 
35 Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative Law as a Critique of Global 
Governance’ Osgoode Hall Law School Research Paper No 1/2012, 19. 
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Fourth, some values can be incommensurable.36 While proportionality assumes measurability 
(i.e., to be balanced, two competing principles should be based on a common denominator),37 
arguments are made that cost-benefit analysis is flawed with respect to public sector decisions due to 
the incommensurability of certain values.38 
Fifth, critical legal theorists contend that ‘hegemonic elites’ might use proportionality to 
entrench their values and shift power from the democratic process to the courts39 and that 
proportionality might have an ‘imperialistic effect’, in that it might set aside local constitutional 
values.40 In the EU law context, the concept of proportionality has fostered the goal of European 
integration.41 With regard to investment law, scholars question whether the application of 
proportionality in investment arbitration could lead to the overprotection of foreign investments.42 The 
use of proportionality analysis can lead to the overprotection of investors’ rights if it is used in a very 
exacting fashion. In fact the proportionality analysis can restrict the regulatory power of the state to a 
large extent if arbitral tribunals do not adopt deferential standards of review. 
In conclusion, proportionality – like any conceptual framework – is not a neutral process; 
rather it is based on the primacy and priority of individual entitlements over the exercise of public 
powers.43 The spread of the proportionality analysis highlights ‘a shift from a culture of authority to a 
                                                 
36 Cass Sunstein, ‘Incommensurability and Valuation in Law’ (1994) 92 Michigan Law Review 779. 
37 Aharon Barak, Proportionality, Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (CUP 2012) 482–84, arguing that a common 
denominator exists in the form of the marginal social importance of each value. 
38 Franck Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (The 
New Press 2004). 
39 Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (Harvard University 
Press 2004). 
40 Cohen-Elya and Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (n 2) 8–9. 
41 Paul Craig and Gráinne De Búrca, EU Law – Text, Cases, and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2011) 532. 
42 Han Xiuli, ‘The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v Mexico’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of 
International Law 635. 
43 Maria Sakellaridou, ‘La Généalogie de la proportionalité’ (Paper presented at the VII World Congress of the International 
Association of Constitutional Law, Athens, 11–15 June 2007) 20. 
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culture of justification,’ which is connected, inter alia, to the rise of the human rights movement which 
developed after WWII. Whether this entails a neglect of a polity’s choices towards a judicial 
dictatorship or the achievement of a higher rule of law – the ultimate rule of law44 – is open to debate. 
Proportionality in European Union Law 
The migration of the proportionality analysis from constitutional law to EU law is a paradigm of 
successful legal transplant. Proportionality is a general principle of EU law and can be used for 
reviewing EU action and Member State action that falls within the sphere of EU law.45 Largely 
fashioned by the Union Courts, proportionality has subsequently assumed treaty status46 since the 
inception of the Maastricht Treaty.47 The criteria for its application are set out in the Protocol No. 2 on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the treaties.48 
The numerous reasons for the success of proportionality in EU law address the criticisms 
moved to proportionality in a seemingly effective fashion. Let us consider how the EU courts have 
transformed the various challenges posed by the proportionality concept in opportunities. First, with 
regard to institutional competences, the courts have interpreted the concept of proportionality in a 
flexible manner,49 conferring it a relative character and showing varying degrees of deference. In some 
cases, the CJEU has adopted ‘a very deferential approach’, in others it has conducted ‘a quite rigorous 
and searching examination of the justification for a measure which has been challenged’.50 In a 
seminal article, De Búrca noted that ‘in reaching decisions, the Court of Justice is influenced not only 
                                                 
44 See generally David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (OUP 2005). 
45 Craig and De Búrca, EU Law (n 41) 526. See generally Ellis (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of Europe 
(n 1); Nicholas Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study (Kluwer 1996). 
46 Art 5 TEU, stating that stating that ‘any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of this Treaty’. 
47 The Treaty on European Union (TEU), signed on 7 February 1992, in force on 1 November 1993. 
48 Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, annexed to the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union by the Treaty of Lisbon of 13 December 2007. 
49 Tor Inge Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (2010) 16 European Law Journal 158. 




by what it considers to be the nature and the importance of the interest or right claimed by the 
applicant, and the nature and importance of the objective alleged to be served by the measure, but by 
the relative expertise, position and overall competence of the Court as against the decision-making 
authority in assessing those factors’.51 
Some authors contend that the Court has adopted a stricter proportionality test when assessing 
national regulation (vertical dimension) and a more lenient approach when assessing Union regulation 
(horizontal dimension).52 Therefore, according to these authors, the court will adopt more demanding 
proportionality test in the former case, requiring the national legislation to choose the less trade 
restrictive alternative.53 In such cases, the Court tends to undertake a strict test of proportionality and 
only the less restrictive measures will be considered as proportionate.54 Instead, when reviewing 
Union action, the court will deem the regulatory measure to be disproportionate only if it finds it 
manifestly inappropriate to achieve the stated objective.55 
                                                 
51 ibid. 
52 See generally Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) chs 3 and 5. 
53 Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (n 49) 172. 
54 See eg Case 104/75, de Peijper [1976] ECR 613, deeming a national measure conditioning the importation of medical 
products to the obtainment of certain documents to be disproportionate as a means to protect public health; Case 120/78 
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649, deeming that the measure requiring a 
minimum alcohol content for a beverage was not necessary to protect consumers as less restrictive ways for protecting them 
could be envisaged, such as labelling. 
55 Harbo, ‘The Function of Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (n 49) 172. For instance, in Hauer, the Court found that the 
Community regulatory measure was proportionate and thus not infringing the right to property. The claimant claimed that a 
Community regulation prohibiting the planting of new vines on certain lands for three years violated her rights to property 
and to pursue a trade. The claim was dismissed as the Court emphasized that the regulation pursued objectives of general 
interest and did not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable interference with the property rights of the owner. The 
prohibition of the new planting of vines for a limited period of time was justified by the objectives of general interest pursued 
by the Community, namely the reduction of production surpluses and the restructuring of the European wine industry. Case 
44/79, Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Phalz [1979] ECR 3727. 
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An alternative viewpoint suggests that the proportionality analysis has been interpreted 
differently according to the various areas it is applied to.56 For instance, the Court has showed a more 
deferential approach in the adjudication of public health-related disputes. By contrast, the Court has 
adopted a strict proportionality test even for Community measures for instance ‘where an individual 
argues that her rights have been unduly restricted by Union action’.57 There are a number of examples 
where such measures were deemed to be disproportionate.58 
Certainly the varied intensity of the proportionality test is not neutral; rather, it is value-laden, 
expressing the Court’s function, that of adjudicating disputes and promoting European integration.59 
Second, with regard to the scale of values, the case of the CJEU is rather unique, as the Court 
has recently acquired a mandate to adjudicate on human rights violations, since the Lisbon Treaty60 
conferred binding nature to the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights.61 Not only has the European 
Union integrated the consideration of human rights in its treaty texts, but it is also negotiating its 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).62 Even before these notable 
institutional developments, since the early 1970s, the Court has considered fundamental rights to be 
general principles of European law, and has referred to the European Convention on Human Rights as 
‘a source of inspiration’.63 Therefore, favouring the objective of European integration does not 
                                                 
56 Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (n 49) 172. 
57 Craig and De Búrca, EU Law (n 41), 529. 
58 See eg Case 114/76 Bela-Muhle v Grows Farm (the Skimmed Milk Case) [1977] ECR 1211, holding that a regulation 
requiring animal foodstuff producers to buy skimmed milk powder at a price three times more expensive than its current 
value was disproportionate. 
59 ibid. 
60 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 
December 2007, 2007 OJ (C306) 1. 
61 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 364/1 (2000). 
62 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, in force 3 September 1953, 
213 UNTS 222. 
63 Gráinne De Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator?’ 
(2013) 14 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 168, 170. 
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necessarily entail a predominance of economic interests vis-à-vis other non-economic values as the 
latter also constitute part of the European project. This is particularly evident in a number of cases.64 
Third, with regard to the cultural arguments, while the Court has derived the proportionality 
concept from the legal orders of some Member States,65 its application of the concept has at times 
converged66 and at times diverged from that of national courts.67 More interestingly, when reviewing 
state measures the CJEU has acknowledged the possibility of different approaches by Member States 
to similar issues,68 and has interpreted proportionality ‘in the light of the Member State’s particular 
values, notwithstanding that those values differ from those of other Member States’.69 In a few cases, 
the invocation of a norm as reflecting constitutional history and identity has been accepted as a ground 
for relaxing the proportionality test.70 
Fourth, with regard to incommensurability, the Court has found a common denominator of the 
various interests at stake in their social function. Finally, with regard to the eventual overprotection of 
property rights, relying on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the ECJ has 
                                                 
64 Cases C-402/05 P and 415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation [2008] ECR I-6351, annulling the 
regulation that froze the funds of Mr Kadi and finding that such measure infringed the right of effective judicial review, and 
the right to property. The regulation had given effect to resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
against the Al-Qaeda; Case C-36/2002, Omega Spielhallen und Automatenaufstellungs GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der 
Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609, upholding a German ban on the commercialization of violent games for protecting 
public policy and human dignity. 
65 Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law’ (n 49) 172. 
66 See eg Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Phalz [1979] ECR 3727 in which both the national court and the ECJ 
held that the relevant Community regulation was proportionate to the stated objective. 
67 See eg Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr und Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] 
ECR 1125 in which the national court had found that Community measure was disproportionate, while the Court deemed it 
proportionate to the stated objective. 
68 Case C-108/96 Criminal Proceedings against Dennis Mac Quen et al [2001] ECR I-837 para 34, stating that ‘the mere fact 
that a Member State has chosen a system of protection different from that adopted by another Member State cannot affect the 
appraisal of the need for and the proportionality of the provisions adopted’. 
69 Craig and De Búrca, EU Law (n 41) 532. 
70 Case C-208/09, Sayn Wittgenstein [2010] ECR I-13693 paras 83 and 92. 
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pointed out that such rights are not absolute and there may be cases in which private interests may be 
limited for the commonweal.71 While this does not mean that all of the cases adjudicated by the CJEU 
have reached an optimal balance between the competing interests,72 at least there is an indication that 
this concern has been considered if not addressed by the CJEU. 
In conclusion, proportionality has migrated successfully from the national legal systems of the 
EU Member States to the EU legal system. On the one hand, the EU courts have relied on the legal 
heritage of the Member States to establish proportionality as a general principle of EU law. On the 
other, they have interpreted the concept of proportionality in a flexible manner – so flexible as to 
transcend the classical understanding of proportionality – shaping and adapting it to the various needs 
of European integration and the parallel protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Ultimately, the migration of proportionality from the national realm to the regional level may 
constitute a case of ‘overfitting legal transplant’, i.e. a legal transplant which ‘work[s] even “better” in 
the transplant than in the origin country’,73 fitting particularly well in the peculiar structure of the 
European Union. In fact, the flexible interpretation of the concept which is at times expanded and at 
times restricted as if it was an accordion allows the courts of the Union to accommodate the 
converging divergences of the Member States promoting the European integration while respecting 
state sovereignty. 
Proportionality in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
                                                 
71 See eg C-331/88 R v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex p Fedesa [1990] ECR I-4023, upholding a 
Community regulation prohibiting the use of hormones in meat production; and Case C-210/03 Swedish Match AB and 
Swedish Match UK Ltd [2004] ECR I-11893, paras 56–58, upholding the ban on tobacco for oral use deeming it to be 
proportionate the stated objective, namely the protection of public health, and acknowledging that other measures such as 
labelling could not achieve the same preventive effect. 
72 See, for instance, Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line 
[2007] ECR I-10779. For commentary, see ACL Davies, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases 
in the ECJ’ (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 126. 
73 Mathias M Siems, ‘The Curious Case of Overfitting Legal Transplants’ in Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut (eds), The 
Method and Culture of Comparative Law: Essays in Honour of Mark Van Hoecke (Hart Publishing, 2014) 133, 134. 
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Now the question is: can proportionality be considered part of international investment law and 
arbitration? Some authors contend that arbitral tribunals should adopt proportionality analysis,74 
stating that ‘proportionality analysis offers the best available doctrinal framework with which to meet 
the present challenges’ to the investment treaty system.75 To the contrary, a few investment law 
scholars have pointed out that ‘there does not seem to be a strong legal basis for the application [of the 
proportionality analysis] in the cases where it has been applied’ and that the conceptual foundations 
for using proportionality analysis in investment arbitration are shaky.76 
Most investment treaties do not refer to proportionality.77 As the European experience shows, 
however, this does not necessarily mean that proportionality is not part of the investment law system. 
In fact, this could be the case if arbitral tribunals used such concept. Therefore, an examination of the 
arbitral practice is of critical relevance for ascertaining whether and, if so how, proportionality has 
migrated to investment treaty arbitration. 
In the past decade arbitral tribunals have increasingly relied on some form of proportionality 
analysis.78 This section explores how they have used the concept of proportionality to define 
substantive standards of protection, including the protection against unlawful expropriation, fair and 
equitable treatment, and non-discrimination. It also discusses some cases in which the applicable 
national law required the use of proportionality and other cases in which proportionality defined the 
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ambit of application of given exceptions. Finally, the section concludes discussing how proportionality 
has been used also with regard to procedural matters. 
With regard to the notion of expropriation, in Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v the 
United Mexican States, which concerned the replacement of an unlimited licence by a licence of 
limited duration for the operation of a landfill, the Arbitral Tribunal used the concept of 
proportionality to ascertain whether given measures could be characterized as expropriatory. The 
Tribunal considered whether such actions or measures were ‘proportional to the public interest 
presumably protected thereby and to the protection legally granted to investments, taking into account 
that the significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the proportionality’.79 
In Azurix, which involved a water concession contract, Argentina had enacted measures for 
the protection of public health after an algae outbreak contaminated water supply after privatization.80 
Warnings not to drink water were enacted and customers were dissuaded from paying their water 
bills.81 In order to ascertain whether there was a (compensable) expropriation or a (non-compensable) 
legitimate exercise of police powers, the Tribunal relied on Tecmed, stating that an expropriatory 
measure must pursue a ‘legitimate aim in the public interest’ and the means employed must be 
(reasonably) proportional to the stated objective.82 The Tribunal dismissed the claim of expropriation. 
In Burlington Resources Inc. v Ecuador, which concerned an investment in the hydrocarbon 
industry, Ecuador contended that ‘[its] intervention in Blocks 7 and 21 did not constitute an 
expropriation of Burlington’s investment; rather, it ‘aimed at preventing significant harm to the 
Blocks’ and in Ecuador’s view it ‘was necessary, adequate, proportionate under the circumstances’.83 
The Arbitral Tribunal confirmed that Ecuador’s intervention in the Blocks ‘was necessary to avoid 
significant economic loss and the risk of permanent damage to the Blocks. It was also appropriate 
                                                 
79 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v the United Mexican States, ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/00/, Award, 29 May 
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81 ibid para 283. 
82 ibid para 311. 
83 Burlington Resources Inc v Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, 14 December 2012, para 164. 
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because Ecuador entered the Blocks without using force. It was equally proportionate as the means 
employed were suited to the ends of protecting the Blocks.’84 
With regard to the fair and equitable treatment standard, in MTD Equity SDN BHD and MTD 
Chile S.A. v Republic of Chile, which concerned the failure of a construction project deemed to be 
inconsistent with zoning regulations, the Arbitral Tribunal held that fair and equitable treatment is ‘a 
broad and widely-accepted standard encompassing such fundamental standards as good faith, due 
process, nondiscrimination and proportionality’.85 In Occidental Petroleum Corporation and 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, which concerned an 
investment in the oil sector, the Arbitral Tribunal stated that ‘numerous investment treaty tribunals 
have found that the principle of proportionality is part and parcel of the overarching duty to accord fair 
and equitable treatment to investors’.86 The claimant contended that a given sanction imposed by 
Ecuador was disproportionate and therefore violated legitimate expectations under the relevant BIT.87 
The Tribunal concluded that the measure ‘was not a proportionate response by Ecuador in the 
particular circumstances of this case’.88 
Yet, in Glamis Gold v United States of America, concerning a gold mining project in 
California, the claimant’s attempt to impose upon respondent the burden of justifying the 
appropriateness of the regulatory measures and proving that they are ‘the least restrictive measures 
available’ and ‘necessary, suitable and proportionate’ failed.89 The Tribunal noted that ‘it is not for an 
international tribunal to delve into the details of and justifications of domestic law’.90 It also stated that 
                                                 
84 ibid para 504. 
85 MTD Equity SDN BHD and MTD Chile S.A. v Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No ARB/01/7, Award, 25 May 2004, para 
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86 Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production Co v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case 
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‘[i]t is not the role of this Tribunal, or any international tribunal, to supplant its own judgment of 
underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified domestic agency’.91 
With regard to non-discrimination, in Parkerings v Lithuania, which concerned the planned 
construction of a parking area, the Tribunal stated that ‘to violate international law, discrimination 
must be unreasonable or lacking proportionality, for instance, it must be inapposite or excessive to 
achieve an otherwise legitimate objective of the State’.92 Yet, in Pope & Talbot, which concerned 
exports of Canadian softwood lumber, the Tribunal dismissed Canada’s argument that the foreign 
investor should prove that it was ‘disproportionately disadvantaged’ by the measure.93 The Tribunal 
considered that the disproportionate advantage test would weaken NAFTA’s ability to protect foreign 
investors.94 
Other cases referred to proportionality as it was a requirement under the applicable national 
law. In Aucoven v Venezuela, relating to a highway concession, Venezuela argued that Aucoven’s 
claims did not meet the criteria of definiteness and proportionality required by Venezuelan law.95 In 
Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, the Tribunal considered that ‘[the] Respondent’s conduct did not 
infringe the principles of legal certainty and proportionality in violation of the full protection and 
safety clause contained in article 2(2) of the BIT’.96 The claimant contended that the host state 
measures were ‘in breach of the principles of due process, proportionality and reasonableness.’97 
However, the Tribunal held that the measures adopted by the host state were ‘discriminatory, 
disproportionate or otherwise improper under Romanian law’.98 In Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
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and Occidental Exploration and Production Company v Republic of Ecuador, the claimant contended 
that ‘both international and Ecuadorian law proscribe the unilateral termination of a government 
contract where … the alleged breach was always known and never objected to by the State, and such 
termination was manifestly unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate’.99 The claimant 
alleged that a given decree was ‘in breach of the Respondent’s obligations under the Treaty and 
Ecuadorian law because it was unfair, arbitrary, discriminatory and disproportionate’.100 The Tribunal 
noted that the proportionality review of the decree ‘pervaded the submissions of both parties’ as ‘the 
Ecuadorian Constitution firmly establishes as a matter of Ecuadorian law the principle of 
proportionality’.101 
In other cases, proportionality was used to define the ambit of application of given exceptions. 
For instance, in Continental Casualty v Argentine Republic, concerning an insurance business, the 
Tribunal imported the ‘weighting and balancing’ formula from international trade law.102 Both parties 
had referred to the concept of proportionality. The claimant pointed out to Argentina’s Supreme Court 
decisions that declared a given decree ‘to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it was an 
unreasonable measure, lacking in proportionality between the deprivation of property rights and the 
objective of averting the crisis …’.103 The Tribunal considered that ‘the Government’s efforts struck 
an appropriate balance between that aim and the responsibility of any government towards the 
country’s population: it is self-evident that not every sacrifice can properly be imposed on a country’s 
people in order to safeguard a certain policy that would ensure full respect towards international 
obligations in the financial sphere, before a breach of those obligations can be considered justified as 
being necessary under this BIT. The standard of reasonableness and proportionality do not require as 
much.’104 
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Finally, proportionality has been used also with regard to matters of procedure. In Libananco 
Holdings Co. Limited v Republic of Turkey, concerning the seizure of two electric utility companies, 
the Tribunal stated that ‘there needs to be some proportionality in the award (as opposed to the 
expenditure) of legal costs and expenses.105 A party with a deep pocket may have its own justification 
for heavy spending, but it cannot expect to be reimbursed for all its expenditure as a matter of course 
simply because it is ultimately the prevailing party’.106 In Liman Caspian Oil BV and NCL Dutch 
Investment BV v Republic of Kazakhstan, concerning a licence to explore and extract hydrocarbons, 
the Tribunal acknowledged that ‘on [the] one hand, ordering the production of documents can be 
helpful for a party to present its case and in the Tribunal’s task of establishing the facts of the case 
relevant for the issues to be decided, but, on the other hand, (1) the process of discovery and disclosure 
may be time consuming, excessively burdensome and even oppressive and that unless carefully 
limited, the burden may be disproportionate to the value of the result, and (2) Parties may have a 
legitimate interest of confidentiality’.107 
These arbitrations took place in a variety of different locations, were conducted by different 
arbitral tribunals under different bilateral treaties and concerned different subject matters and causes of 
action. One may legitimately wonder whether there is any commonality between these awards. One 
may also legitimately wonder the relevance of discussing previous awards, given the fact that there is 
no binding precedent in international (investment) law. 
Nonetheless, these awards show an increasingly frequent use of some form of proportionality 
analysis in investor-state arbitration. Proportionality analysis is used in a varying of contexts; for 
delimiting substantive standards of protection, clarifying procedural matters and even quantifying 
damages and legal fees. Moreover, awards can and do influence subsequent awards. 
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Yet, the proportionality analysis is not used consistently in investment treaty arbitration. As 
mentioned, arbitral tribunals have used the proportionality concept in different contexts. 
Proportionality is often mentioned in passing together with other concepts such as reasonableness and 
rationality. Most tribunals have not used it at all. More importantly, no single unified notion of 
proportionality has been used; rather arbitral tribunals seem to have elaborated ad hoc notions of 
proportionality depending on circumstances. In the context of investment arbitration, the 
proportionality analysis lacks the clear and consistent structure it has in other fields of national, 
regional and international law.108 
In conclusion, while generic reference to proportionality has increased in the awards rendered 
in the past decade, a critical mass of awards relying on this test is missing. In addition, at an analytical 
level, one may legitimately wonder whether proportionality can contribute to better awards given the 
specific features of international investment law. 
Proportionality in International Trade Law 
The question as to whether proportionality is a pillar of international trade law remains debated. On 
the one hand, some scholars point out that the text of the WTO Agreements do not refer to 
proportionality in explicit terms and that only some elements of the proportionality analysis are used 
in the jurisprudence of the WTO panels and the Appellate Body.109 On the other hand, other scholars 
contend that ‘the principle of proportionality is one of the more basic principles underlying the 
multilateral trading system’.110 
As this section shows, while the WTO Agreements do not expressly refer to proportionality, 
the WTO adjudicative bodies have used some elements of the proportionality analysis. This is not to 
say that there exists a principle of proportionality embedded in WTO law; rather, some elements of 
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proportionality are ingrained in the system for reconciling trade and non-trade issues. WTO provisions 
that reflect elements of the proportionality analysis ‘include words such as “necessary”, 
“proportionate”, “less trade restrictive”, and “commensurate”’.111 In particular, elements of 
proportionality analysis play a role in three major areas of international trade law: (1) the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT);112 (2) the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT 
Agreement)113 and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement);114 as well as (3) in the determination of countermeasures.115 
With regard to the first area,116 GATT article XX provides a list of general exceptions. WTO 
Members can adopt measures that would prima facie be in breach of the relevant GATT obligations 
provided that they comply with the conditions laid down in this provision. GATT article XX is divided 
into two parts. The first part of the provision – generally known as the chapeau – relates to the way a 
given policy is implemented. The second part of the provision includes a detailed list of policy 
objectives. Some paragraphs require that a measure be necessary to protect a specific public policy 
objective (e.g. public morals; human, animal or plant life or health). Other paragraphs require that a 
given measure be related to other objectives such as the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 
The assessment of the necessity of a given measure to reach the particular objectives 
mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b), (d) and (i) of article XX – including the protection of public morals 
and of human, animal or plant life or health – requires some elements of the proportionality analysis, 
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namely the suitability and necessity tests. As Shoenbaum points out, there has been a semantic change 
in the interpretation of necessary, as ‘necessary no longer relates to the protection of living things, but 
to whether or not the measure is a “necessary” departure from the trade agreement.’117 In the Thai – 
Cigarettes case, the panel stated that trade restrictions were necessary ‘only if there were no 
alternative measures consistent with the GATT or less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could 
reasonably be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives’.118 In Korea – Beef, the AB 
stated that the necessity of a measure should be ascertained taking into account, first, ‘the extent to 
which the measure contribute to the realization of the end pursued’, and, second, ‘the extent to which 
the compliance measure produces restrictive effects on international commerce’.119 The AB added that 
‘determination of whether a measure … may … be “necessary” … involves in every case a process of 
weighting and balancing a series of factors which … include the importance of the … interests or 
values protected by that law or regulation at issue, and the accompanying impact of the law or 
regulation on imports or exports’.120 The jurisprudence of panels and AB has treated certain values 
more deferentially than others. For instance, in the EC – Asbestos case, the AB noted that health is 
‘vital and important to the highest degree’,121 and held that the adopted measures were indispensable. 
Once the adjudicative body reaches a preliminary conclusion that the measure is necessary, ‘this result 
must be confirmed by comparing the measure with its possible alternatives, which may be less trade 
                                                 
117 Thomas J Shoenbaum, ‘International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation’ 
(1997) 91 AJIL 269, 276, mentioned in Gisele Kapterian, ‘A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on Necessity’ (2010) 59 
ICLQ 89. 
118 Panel Report, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, 7 November 1990, DS10/R – 
37 S/200, para 75. 
119 Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 11 December 2000, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, para 163. 
120 ibid para 164. 
121 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, 12 
March 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R, para 172. 
24 
 
restrictive while providing an equivalent contribution to the achievement of the objective pursued’.122 
The necessity test helps identifying ‘whether a less WTO-inconsistent measure is reasonably 
available’.123 This judicial development marked an evolution ‘from the least trade restrictive approach 
to the less trade restrictive one’.124 
The necessity test has been criticized as ‘overbroad and under-inclusive’ at the same time.125 
On the one hand, ‘it seems to elevate trade values to a pre-eminent status’.126 On the other hand, as 
noted by Trachtman, ‘by keeping the regulatory benefit constant and working on the trade detriment 
side’, the necessity test, as it is used at the WTO ‘evaluates a much more limited range of options, 
ignoring other groups of options that may be superior’.127 However, the fact that the necessity test does 
not address the chosen level of protection that a member wants to achieve but the design of the 
instrument it has chosen to use restricts the discretion of the adjudicators and indicates that a fully 
fledged proportionality analysis or balancing is still missing from this sector of WTO adjudication. 
The assessment of the relation between a given measure and one of the particular objectives 
mentioned in the specific paragraphs of GATT article XX includes some elements of the 
proportionality analysis, namely the suitability and proportionality (in the strict sense) tests. For 
instance, in US – Shrimp, the AB clarified that the requirement ‘relating to’ is about a ‘close and 
genuine relationship of ends and means’.128 It added that the design of the measure was ‘not 
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disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of protection and 
conservation of sea turtle species’.129 
After a measure is found to be provisionally justified under any of the specific paragraphs of 
article XX, the adjudicators turn to the chapeau of the same provision to assess whether the 
application of the measure does not constitute an ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail’ or ‘a disguised restriction on trade’.130 Although the 
chapeau does not in itself contain a proportionality requirement, some scholars consider that it is an 
expression of, or at least ‘resembles, a proportionality analysis’.131 First, lack of proportionality can 
help ascertaining the arbitrariness or discriminatory nature of given regulatory measures.132 Second, 
the AB held that it ‘embodies the recognition on the part of the WTO Members of the need to maintain 
a balance of rights and obligations between the right of a member to invoke one or another of the 
exceptions of article XX … on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members under 
the GATT 1994, on the other hand’.133 
Other elements of the proportionality analysis surface in the interpretation of certain 
provisions of the SPS and TBT Agreement. For instance, article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement requires 
that ‘Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence …’. On the one hand, ‘sufficient scientific evidence’ 
has been deemed to embody elements of the suitability test. In Japan – Apples, the AB held that the 
sufficient scientific evidence criterion required ‘a rational and objective relationship’ between the 
measure and the relevant scientific evidence.134 On the other hand, article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement 
clarifies that measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and health should not be ‘more 
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trade restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of … protection, taking into account 
technical and economic feasibility’.135 
Finally, elements of the proportionality analysis appear in the determination of 
countermeasures and in enforcement provisions. For instance, article 46 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement)136 refers to the ‘need of 
proportionality’ in the context of enforcement provisions.137 In parallel, footnote 9 of article 4.10 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)138 clarifies that 
‘appropriate countermeasures’ do not include ‘countermeasures that are disproportionate’.139 In EC – 
Bananas, the arbitrators refused to ‘double-count’ nullification of benefits, as this would be contrary to 
‘the general international law principle of proportionality of countermeasures’.140 In US – Line Pipe, 
the AB held that the idea that ‘countermeasures in response to breaches by States of their international 
obligations’ should ‘be proportionate to such breaches’ is ‘a recognized principle of customary 
international law’, which is fully applicable in the WTO system.141 An arbitral tribunal has similarly 
acknowledged the ‘customary international law’ nature of the proportionality requirement for the 
validity of countermeasures.142 
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In conclusion, while there is no explicit reference to proportionality in the WTO Agreement, 
and there is uncertainty as to whether proportionality is a general principle of international law, some 
elements of the proportionality analysis appear in the interpretation and application of certain 
provisions of the WTO Agreements. 
A History of Success? 
While the migration of constitutional ideas can be particularly successful in certain contexts, this may 
not be the case in others. Why is proportionality so successful in EU adjudication and, albeit to a lesser 
extent, in WTO dispute settlement, while investment treaty tribunals have shown a more fragmented if 
not recalcitrant approach? The answer is multifold. 
First, EU law, WTO law and investment law present very different institutional settings. EU 
law builds upon and has fostered legal cohesion in the Union, constituting a sui generis system lying 
between a fully fledged constitutional order and an international organization.143 Joseph Weiler has 
argued that ‘one of the great perceived truism, or myths, of the EU legal order is its alleged rupture 
with, or mutation from, public international law and its transformation into a constitutional legal 
order.’144 Certainly, the Union is not a federal system, and the failure to ratify an explicit EU 
Constitution in 2005 signals some reticence in that regard at least in some Member States.145 Yet, EU 
law has a ‘constitutional dimension’.146 Over time, the EU treaties have been perceived as having 
assumed some constitutional features.147 Although the Treaty of Rome was concluded in the form of 
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an international treaty, it has become the constitutional charter of the Union.148 In fact, the European 
Court of Justice played a pivotal role in creating a material constitution in its judgments,149 holding 
that the treaties founding the European Communities (now the European Union) established a new 
legal order whose subjects do not comprise Member States only but also their nationals.150 
Commentators have pointed out that the court ‘constru[ed] the European Communities Treaties in a 
constitutional mode rather than employing the traditional international law methodology’.151 More 
fundamentally, the integration project relies on the common constitutional principles of the EU 
member states.152 
In parallel, since the inception of the World Trade Organization in 1995, international trade 
law has gone through a process of juridification, to an extent unknown before.153 Some authors have 
argued that the WTO presents some constitutional features already, albeit this remains contested.154 
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By contrast, international investment law is a relatively fragmented system, where different 
arbitral tribunals interpret different treaties. Because of the lack of binding precedent in investment 
arbitration, it may be difficult to elaborate a consistent proportionality test. Furthermore, EU law, 
WTO law and international investment law are at a different stage of development155 and this makes 
their comparison necessarily approximate and perhaps premature. 
Second, despite some commonalities, EU law, WTO law and international investment law 
have very different aims and objectives. All of these systems presuppose a triangular relationship 
between: (1) the individual (the EU citizen, the trader and the investor respectively); (2) the state (the 
Member State, the trading nations or host state respectively); and (3) the supranational court (the 
CJEU or the WTO ‘courts’ or the relevant arbitral tribunal respectively).156 Despite this common 
tripartite framework, very different assumptions underlie the three systems. On the one hand, the once 
European Economic Community (EEC) ‘market citizen’ (Marktbürger)  entitled to market freedoms 
under the EEC Treaty157 has become a European Union citizen entitled to human rights, not only of an 
economic nature. Therefore, the balancing process takes place in a system where economic interests 
are part of a broader picture. By contrast, both international trade law and international investment law 
aim at fostering free trade and foreign direct investments respectively thus promoting economic 
development.158 Neither the WTO dispute settlement mechanism nor arbitral tribunals have the 
comprehensive jurisdiction of the CJEU; rather they have a more limited mandate. 
                                                 
155 While there are thousands of publicly available cases adjudicated by the CJEU, the available investment awards are much 
more limited. 
156 For analogous reasoning with regard to EU law, see Norbert Reich, ‘How Proportionate is the Proportionality Principle? 
Some Critical Remarks on the Use and Methodology of the Proportionality Principle in the Internal Market Case Law of the 
ECJ’ (paper presented at the Oslo conference on ‘The Reach of Free Movement’, 2011). 
157 ibid 11. 
158 Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘Why Multinationals Help Reduce Poverty’ (2007) 30 World Economy 211; VN Balasubramanyam, M 
Salisu and D Sapsford, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: New Hypotheses and Evidence’ (1999) 8 Journal of 
International Trade and Economic Development 27. 
30 
 
Third, while the CJEU has borrowed the proportionality principles from the legal systems of 
its Member States, and WTO law includes some elements of proportionality analysis, the role of 
proportionality analysis in international investment law and arbitration is far from settled. Unless the 
concept of proportionality is a principle of international law, or is part of the applicable law its 
application might seem shaky in the context of investment treaty arbitration. Moreover, arbitral 
tribunals have used proportionality in conjunction with other criteria such as reasonableness and 
rationality. 
On the other hand, further reflection on methodological issues is of key importance. 
Methodological concerns have long been a common feature of comparative constitutional law.159 
Although there is no single methodological model in comparative law, two fundamental approaches to 
the field have emerged: the functional approach and the cultural approach.160 
The functional approach relies on the assumption that law addresses social problems and that 
all societies confront essentially the same challenges.161 The functional approach thus presupposes 
similarity among legal systems (praesumptio similitudinis),162 potentially reflecting ‘epistemological 
optimism’, i.e., the belief that legal systems are comparable.163 For instance, Alan Watson contended 
that there is no inherent relationship between law and society – being autonomous from any social 
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structure, law develops by transplanting.164 Inevitably, the concept will adapt to the new context. 
According to Watson, the adaptation does not imply the failure of the transplant; rather it is a natural 
process.165 
By contrast, cultural approaches contend that law expresses and develops the cultural features 
of a society. Therefore, not only do comparativists need to consider the functions of legal concepts, 
but they also have to contextualize such concepts in their legal matrix and culture of origin.166 
Meaningful comparisons require understanding the cultural context of legal rules.167 For instance, Otto 
Kahn-Freund believed that law cannot be separated from its context.168 According to Kahn-Freund, 
not only should one verify whether the item that would be borrowed has proven satisfactory in its 
system of origin, but she should consider whether it would be suitable to the potentially recipient 
system.169 Each legal system is unique, reflecting a particular worldview170 and constituting a ‘cultural 
expression’.171 
Despite their differences, comparative law methodologies share a number of caveats and a 
common denominator. For instance, borrowing based on inadequately verified information should be 
avoided (e.g. when adjudicators rely on sources provided by the parties without further research). 
Analogously, reference to certain legal systems as examples should be justified. If comparisons are 
made, these should be explicit rather than implicit. The understanding of the borrowed items should be 
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proper, accurate and contextual. More fundamentally, one should consider whether the migration of 
constitutional ideas to transnational systems fits the culture of such systems. 
Finally judicial borrowing cannot be a mechanical process also in consideration of the fact that 
until recently both comparative law and international law used to have a Westphalian172 – if not 
Eurocentric – character.173 For a long time, comparative law (has) focused on European legal systems; 
the law of former colonies – with the exception of US law – was largely overlooked. In other words, 
by limiting its focus to Western legal traditions, comparative law contributed to the legitimization of 
an order in which peripheral countries were recognized very limited if any creative contribution to the 
market of legal ideas.174 Comparative law scholars (have) assumed that law is almost completely of 
European making, unfolded through nearly the entire world via colonialism, imperialism and trade. 
In parallel, the making of international law used to have a predominantly Western character.175 
Some authors have even questioned whether and how international is international law,176 highlighting 
‘the idea of international law as an ordering mechanism that draws its categories from an essential 
culture and yet stands apart from its cultural context’.177 The origins of international law are imbued of 
civil law ideas; the fathers of international law – such as Grotius, Gentili and others – borrowed 
concepts from their traditions which in turn regarded Roman law as the standard by which justice 
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should be measured.178 Furthermore, international law mainly governed relations among states, despite 
some treaties which also regulated the interaction between states and indigenous peoples.179 
In the post-colonial era, however, there is an emergent awareness that diffusion of law does 
not necessarily lead to convergence, harmonization, or unification of laws. On the one hand, scholars 
have pointed out the multicultural genealogy of the Western legal tradition.180 On the other hand, the 
imported law did not remain the same; legal transplants are ‘transformed by the new context’.181 
Furthermore, in a number of countries – the so-called mixed jurisdictions – the Romano-Germanic 
tradition and the common law have met and mingled for historical reasons with variegated 
outcomes.182 More recently economic globalization has spurred the constant contact and 
communication among legal cultures facilitating processes of mutual borrowing, cross-fertilization 
and learning.183 Therefore many characteristics which define and shape legal families ‘are fading or 
spreading into other systems’.184 
In conclusion, the migration of proportionality from constitutional law to EU law has been a 
relatively straightforward process due to the fact that such principles already belonged to the legal 
heritage of a few Member States. European courts have borrowed the concept of proportionality and 
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adapted it to their own needs. In some areas,  the CJEU interprets proportionality in a way that is 
closer to the reasonableness test than the classical proportionality analysis.185  While proportionality 
may have become an enfant terrible of the Court due to its unpredictability,186 the migration has been 
successful exactly because the European courts have adapted it to the needs of European integration. 
In parallel, some elements of proportionality analysis appear in the treaty text of some WTO covered 
agreements. One may wonder whether the same preconditions for success also exist in investment 
arbitration. Arbitrators should be aware of the methodological risks and opportunities offered by 
comparative reasoning: more fundamentally, they should be aware of their mandate to adjudicate the 
relevant disputes ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’.187 
Conclusions 
The migration of legal concepts has become an increasingly common phenomenon, highlighting a 
cosmopolitan character of law.188 Conceived as an analytical tool to assist adjudicators in determining 
the interaction between public and private interests, the concept of proportionality has attracted 
increasing attention by scholars and policymakers and has migrated from constitutional law to a 
number of other fields of national, regional and international law. Proportionality can restrain the 
exercise of public authority, shape judicial review and manage private actors’ expectations. 
This study investigated the question as to whether and if so, to what extent, proportionality has 
migrated from constitutional law to EU law, international trade law and international investment law. 
The migration of proportionality to EU law is a paradigmatic case of successful legal transplant. The 
migration of proportionality to WTO law seems relatively settled. The migration of proportionality to 
international investment law and arbitration remains a work in progress. Eminent authors forcefully 
suggest a broader use of proportionality in international investment law and arbitration. Others 
consider proportionality analysis to be inappropriate for arbitral tribunals. Rather, they consider that a 
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degree of deference should be paid to the sovereign choices of the host state. Against this background, 
this chapter has examined the relevant jurisprudence and proposed an alternative viewpoint, 
highlighting the pros and cons, and the methodological issues raised by the migration of 
proportionality from one field to another. If international economic ‘courts’ are to use proportionality 
to form their interpretation of particular provisions, they must ensure that they master the relevant 
methodological risks and opportunities. In conclusion, 
the adoption of proportionality is not a neutral process as it may have important consequences. 
Certainly, more comparative constitutional law studies are needed to address the question as to 
whether proportionality is a general principle of international law. 
